Title
The J Curve
A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall
Author
Ian Bremmer
Adjunct Professor, School for International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
President, Eurasia Group
Publication Date
2006
Publication Information
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks; 291 pages
Reason for Reading
The author, Ian Bremmer was on The Daily Show on May 13th pitching his newest book, “The End of the Free Market.” In the interview, he seemed to be knowledgeable, thoughtful, and articulate so I thought his book would be worth checking out. While searching, I discovered a previous book of his in the bargain section of Amazon, so I thought I’d try that one first.
Synopsis
I would say the book can be broken down into two main themes. The first is the description of the J curve itself. Specifically this refers to the shape you get if you essentially graph a country’s openness of government (x-axis) against the country’s stability (y-axis). As such, authoritarian governments are more stable than partially open systems, and countries must traverse a period of instability and potential chaos to become a stable, open democracy. But there are inherent difficulties in such a switch. The book is organized into six chapters, of which the middle four discuss countries at different points on the curve. These are far left side states (Iraq, North Korea, Cuba), states sliding toward instability (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia), states in the depths of the curve (South Africa, Yugoslavia), and states just on the right side of the curve (Turkey, Israel, India). Additionally, there’s a chapter on the somewhat special case of China.
The second theme running through the course of the book essentially deals with how states firmly entrenched on the right side of the curve should deal with countries trying to make the switch from left to right. A notable undercurrent to this is that entrenched right side countries often act misguidedly in their interactions with authoritarian regimes, with the notable examples the far left side states of North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq.
Review
I rather liked this book overall. The format is set up so each section of the curve specifically deals with 2-3 countries. But for each country, the author delves into a short history of the country, or at least the relevant information to where they are at now, politically. This was ideal for me, as outside the far left states, I really had very little knowledge of the other countries' situations.
Beyond that, the book does an excellent job of describing the regular methods with which countries such as the US or European countries interact with states somewhere in this process, and detailing what has worked as well as (often) what hasn’t, and why. What I found most intriguing about this was essentially that sanctions against countries such as Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba are a poor way of trying to topple their leaders. Bremmer argues that usually the sanctions create an isolation that is actually what those leaders want, and it reduces the amount of resources they must expend on isolating their own people while simultaneously giving them an enemy to unite their own people against (usually the US as the great evil imposing the hardships on the people of those countries).
As for a shortcoming of the book, I would say is that for the most part the concept is very simple, as are most of the running themes. People with more than a cursory knowledge of these countries would not need much of the information presented. The overall J curve concept was summarized quite well in the opening chapter. On top of that, if one considers a basic tenet of economics – namely that most things have unintended consequences, and finally add on that stable government should re-consider what it is that the left-side leaders are ultimately trying to attain, and you have the most important ideas from the book. But to skip the book entirely would mean missing out on many of the nuances of policy recommendations the author makes or pitfalls of which he makes examples. And that’s really the crux of the book.
Additionally, though the author mentions that states can go both ways, he doesn’t really address any that slid from the right side into chaos or even back to the left side. All the countries presented were either on the left side of the curve, or going through to the right. I think at best he mentions that a few on the lower right side of the curve are in a precarious position.
Quotes
“In general, the stability of countries on the left side of the J curve depends on individual leaders—Stalin, Mao, Idi Amin. The stability of states on the right side of the curve depends on institutions—parliaments independent of the executive, judiciaries independent of both, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, citizens’ groups. Movement from left to right along the J curve demonstrates that a country that is stable because it is closed must go through a period of dangerous instability as it opens to the outside world. There are no shortcuts, because authoritarian elites cannot be quickly replaced with institutions whose legitimacy is widely accepted.” (6)
“History, geography, culture, and other factors give each state its own particular strengths and vulnerabilities. As a consequence, each state has its own J curve, though each curve retains the same basic shape. North Korea’s J curve is much lower than Saudi Arabia’s, because North Korea lacks the resources, like oil, that can raise stability at any given level of openness.” (12)
“In fact, there is no better example than the Cuban trade embargo of a policy based on the view that repressive foreign governments should be punished. But to punish Cuba is to help Castro realize his goal—the reinforcement of his police state.” (49)
“Saddam took few risks with his personal security, but in the end, he repeatedly gambled on foreign policy and ignited wars that produced the shocks that pushed Iraq down the curve toward instability. Saddam the gambler is in prison today because he violated the cardinal rule leaders must respect if they are to manage their country’s position on the left side of the J curve: If your country is built on fault lines, don’t produce your own earthquakes.” (59)
“U.S. policy toward Arab states has too often been predicated on a false choice: coercion or conversation, demands or diplomacy, all with only the existing authoritarian leadership in mind. Too little effort has been made to look beyond ruling elites toward others who seek peaceful change and greater openness.” (81)
“The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the central drivers of instability in the twenty-first century. That is one important reason Iran is included in this book. Those states that remain on the left side of the J curve and have, or may soon have, nuclear weapons pose the gravest threat to successful navigation of the J curve’s least stable segment. A nuclear state that descends into chaos may send nuclear equipment and technology in all directions. Because the world can’t afford such a catastrophe, the United States and its allies can’t simply accept another potentially unstable nuclearized state.” (101)
“The central question of this book is not “will tyrannies collapse?” As noted in the foreword, the book is an attempt to address the following questions: How can we better understand the processes that destroy tyrannies and nourish open governance? In an age when instability can produce nuclear terrorism, severe international economic disruption, and the transnational movement of crime, refugees, drugs, and disease, how do we prepare for the time when closed states go under? What role can the international community play in helping these states manage their transitions toward greater harmony with everything around them?” (148)
“It is a central thesis of this book that sanctions often produce the opposite of their intended effect, and that closed states should be opened as far as possible to the integrationist, dynamizing effects of globalization. But South Africa is an exceptional case.” (164)
“This problem demonstrates a weakness inherent in a left-side-of-the-curve state’s ability to control information. In a state where the ruling elite dominates the mass media distribution channels, rumor and misinformation become more potent.” (174)
“Yugoslavia is examined here in detail because it illustrates that a state may fall into the depths of the J curve and fail to reemerge on either side. It may simply fail. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are the world’s most recent examples of how such a total state failure can occur.” (189)
“A right-side-of-the-J-curve state is one that is stable precisely because it is open to the political, economic, social, and cultural influences of the outside world. This openness is reflected in its domestic political and economic life. It is a state that legally enshrines protections for the civil and human rights of at least the clear majority of its citizens. The institutions of government, independent of one another, reinforce state stability. Leaders govern with the consent of (at least most of) the governed. Barriers to participation in the economic life of the nation are relatively low. The movement of people, ideas, information, goods, and services across internal and external borders is free. The most stable of these states thrive on change.” (191)
“For decades, the United States has been the ‘guarantor of last resort’ for Israel’s security. There are many reasons for this. There is a political and economic affinity based on the fact that Israel is the only democracy and the only right-side-of-the-J-curve state in the region. It is surrounded by Arab states that are traditionally hostile to Israel’s existence. In addition, there is a cultural affinity because the United States has a substantial Jewish minority and because the evangelical Christian community celebrates a “Judeo-Christian” connection.” (213)
“Although the concept of caste dates to ancient Hindu texts and has not always produced social strife, the British heightened awareness of caste differences as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.” … “Both Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru argued that caste was a tool of exploitation used by outsiders and should be abandoned.” (231)
“Sharansky argues that if a citizen can walk into the middle of the town square and express his views without fear that police will arrest or assault him, he lives in a free society. In Beijing, the town square test still produces a Tiananmen Square result. By Sharansky’s definition, China’s is not a free society and has no place on the right side of the J curve.” (243)
“India and China offer intriguing mirror images. Modern India has long been open politically and, until recently, closed economically. Modern China has opened economically, but remains politically closed. The comparison reveals that, while politics and economics can never be fully separated, political openness is a better guarantor of long-term stability than economic openness.” (259)
“A people who fear economic insecurity will defer calls for freedom and representative government in favor of support for (or at least submission to) a single clear voice promising food, jobs, and social guarantees. The purpose, therefore, of lifting the entire J curve through economic reform and the creation of a broad middle class is to reduce demand for authoritarianism and to build the necessary public confidence that increases demand for an opening up of society.” (271)
Further Reading
The J Curve on Google Books
The J Curve
A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall
Author
Ian Bremmer
Adjunct Professor, School for International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
President, Eurasia Group
Publication Date
2006
Publication Information
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks; 291 pages
Reason for Reading
The author, Ian Bremmer was on The Daily Show on May 13th pitching his newest book, “The End of the Free Market.” In the interview, he seemed to be knowledgeable, thoughtful, and articulate so I thought his book would be worth checking out. While searching, I discovered a previous book of his in the bargain section of Amazon, so I thought I’d try that one first.
Synopsis
I would say the book can be broken down into two main themes. The first is the description of the J curve itself. Specifically this refers to the shape you get if you essentially graph a country’s openness of government (x-axis) against the country’s stability (y-axis). As such, authoritarian governments are more stable than partially open systems, and countries must traverse a period of instability and potential chaos to become a stable, open democracy. But there are inherent difficulties in such a switch. The book is organized into six chapters, of which the middle four discuss countries at different points on the curve. These are far left side states (Iraq, North Korea, Cuba), states sliding toward instability (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia), states in the depths of the curve (South Africa, Yugoslavia), and states just on the right side of the curve (Turkey, Israel, India). Additionally, there’s a chapter on the somewhat special case of China.
The second theme running through the course of the book essentially deals with how states firmly entrenched on the right side of the curve should deal with countries trying to make the switch from left to right. A notable undercurrent to this is that entrenched right side countries often act misguidedly in their interactions with authoritarian regimes, with the notable examples the far left side states of North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq.
Review
I rather liked this book overall. The format is set up so each section of the curve specifically deals with 2-3 countries. But for each country, the author delves into a short history of the country, or at least the relevant information to where they are at now, politically. This was ideal for me, as outside the far left states, I really had very little knowledge of the other countries' situations.
Beyond that, the book does an excellent job of describing the regular methods with which countries such as the US or European countries interact with states somewhere in this process, and detailing what has worked as well as (often) what hasn’t, and why. What I found most intriguing about this was essentially that sanctions against countries such as Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba are a poor way of trying to topple their leaders. Bremmer argues that usually the sanctions create an isolation that is actually what those leaders want, and it reduces the amount of resources they must expend on isolating their own people while simultaneously giving them an enemy to unite their own people against (usually the US as the great evil imposing the hardships on the people of those countries).
As for a shortcoming of the book, I would say is that for the most part the concept is very simple, as are most of the running themes. People with more than a cursory knowledge of these countries would not need much of the information presented. The overall J curve concept was summarized quite well in the opening chapter. On top of that, if one considers a basic tenet of economics – namely that most things have unintended consequences, and finally add on that stable government should re-consider what it is that the left-side leaders are ultimately trying to attain, and you have the most important ideas from the book. But to skip the book entirely would mean missing out on many of the nuances of policy recommendations the author makes or pitfalls of which he makes examples. And that’s really the crux of the book.
Additionally, though the author mentions that states can go both ways, he doesn’t really address any that slid from the right side into chaos or even back to the left side. All the countries presented were either on the left side of the curve, or going through to the right. I think at best he mentions that a few on the lower right side of the curve are in a precarious position.
Quotes
“In general, the stability of countries on the left side of the J curve depends on individual leaders—Stalin, Mao, Idi Amin. The stability of states on the right side of the curve depends on institutions—parliaments independent of the executive, judiciaries independent of both, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, citizens’ groups. Movement from left to right along the J curve demonstrates that a country that is stable because it is closed must go through a period of dangerous instability as it opens to the outside world. There are no shortcuts, because authoritarian elites cannot be quickly replaced with institutions whose legitimacy is widely accepted.” (6)
“History, geography, culture, and other factors give each state its own particular strengths and vulnerabilities. As a consequence, each state has its own J curve, though each curve retains the same basic shape. North Korea’s J curve is much lower than Saudi Arabia’s, because North Korea lacks the resources, like oil, that can raise stability at any given level of openness.” (12)
“In fact, there is no better example than the Cuban trade embargo of a policy based on the view that repressive foreign governments should be punished. But to punish Cuba is to help Castro realize his goal—the reinforcement of his police state.” (49)
“Saddam took few risks with his personal security, but in the end, he repeatedly gambled on foreign policy and ignited wars that produced the shocks that pushed Iraq down the curve toward instability. Saddam the gambler is in prison today because he violated the cardinal rule leaders must respect if they are to manage their country’s position on the left side of the J curve: If your country is built on fault lines, don’t produce your own earthquakes.” (59)
“U.S. policy toward Arab states has too often been predicated on a false choice: coercion or conversation, demands or diplomacy, all with only the existing authoritarian leadership in mind. Too little effort has been made to look beyond ruling elites toward others who seek peaceful change and greater openness.” (81)
“The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the central drivers of instability in the twenty-first century. That is one important reason Iran is included in this book. Those states that remain on the left side of the J curve and have, or may soon have, nuclear weapons pose the gravest threat to successful navigation of the J curve’s least stable segment. A nuclear state that descends into chaos may send nuclear equipment and technology in all directions. Because the world can’t afford such a catastrophe, the United States and its allies can’t simply accept another potentially unstable nuclearized state.” (101)
“The central question of this book is not “will tyrannies collapse?” As noted in the foreword, the book is an attempt to address the following questions: How can we better understand the processes that destroy tyrannies and nourish open governance? In an age when instability can produce nuclear terrorism, severe international economic disruption, and the transnational movement of crime, refugees, drugs, and disease, how do we prepare for the time when closed states go under? What role can the international community play in helping these states manage their transitions toward greater harmony with everything around them?” (148)
“It is a central thesis of this book that sanctions often produce the opposite of their intended effect, and that closed states should be opened as far as possible to the integrationist, dynamizing effects of globalization. But South Africa is an exceptional case.” (164)
“This problem demonstrates a weakness inherent in a left-side-of-the-curve state’s ability to control information. In a state where the ruling elite dominates the mass media distribution channels, rumor and misinformation become more potent.” (174)
“Yugoslavia is examined here in detail because it illustrates that a state may fall into the depths of the J curve and fail to reemerge on either side. It may simply fail. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are the world’s most recent examples of how such a total state failure can occur.” (189)
“A right-side-of-the-J-curve state is one that is stable precisely because it is open to the political, economic, social, and cultural influences of the outside world. This openness is reflected in its domestic political and economic life. It is a state that legally enshrines protections for the civil and human rights of at least the clear majority of its citizens. The institutions of government, independent of one another, reinforce state stability. Leaders govern with the consent of (at least most of) the governed. Barriers to participation in the economic life of the nation are relatively low. The movement of people, ideas, information, goods, and services across internal and external borders is free. The most stable of these states thrive on change.” (191)
“For decades, the United States has been the ‘guarantor of last resort’ for Israel’s security. There are many reasons for this. There is a political and economic affinity based on the fact that Israel is the only democracy and the only right-side-of-the-J-curve state in the region. It is surrounded by Arab states that are traditionally hostile to Israel’s existence. In addition, there is a cultural affinity because the United States has a substantial Jewish minority and because the evangelical Christian community celebrates a “Judeo-Christian” connection.” (213)
“Although the concept of caste dates to ancient Hindu texts and has not always produced social strife, the British heightened awareness of caste differences as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.” … “Both Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru argued that caste was a tool of exploitation used by outsiders and should be abandoned.” (231)
“Sharansky argues that if a citizen can walk into the middle of the town square and express his views without fear that police will arrest or assault him, he lives in a free society. In Beijing, the town square test still produces a Tiananmen Square result. By Sharansky’s definition, China’s is not a free society and has no place on the right side of the J curve.” (243)
“India and China offer intriguing mirror images. Modern India has long been open politically and, until recently, closed economically. Modern China has opened economically, but remains politically closed. The comparison reveals that, while politics and economics can never be fully separated, political openness is a better guarantor of long-term stability than economic openness.” (259)
“A people who fear economic insecurity will defer calls for freedom and representative government in favor of support for (or at least submission to) a single clear voice promising food, jobs, and social guarantees. The purpose, therefore, of lifting the entire J curve through economic reform and the creation of a broad middle class is to reduce demand for authoritarianism and to build the necessary public confidence that increases demand for an opening up of society.” (271)
Further Reading
The J Curve on Google Books
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