For reference - a link to to lecture and associated readings:
The Morality of Murder and Cannibalism
I'm not entirely sure how we should arrange these discussions, but I suspect as we go on, we'll come to some normal format for the initial posts, much like our book reviews. For now I'll just start by formulating my thoughts/responses to the lecture and readings. Feel free to respond to anything you think worth discussing or bringing up any other points you think are worthy of discussion.
In regards to the lecture, I guess I had a few main thoughts. First among these is that the initial scenario suggested is extremely simplistic. In terms of making a point or starting a discussion, I consider that a perfectly valid method. However, where I think it becomes problematic is in the transition to asking what is the right thing to do. Framing the initial problem as a simple scenario and asking what's right or wrong implies a simple answer. I don't think that's necessarily the case. An example of this is shown shortly thereafter in the second scenario Dr. Sandel presents. The question is asked, are the men in the lifeboat guilty of murder, and people are supposed to answer whether they consider these men guilty of murder or not, essentially as if they were on the jury for them. I'm having a difficult time articulating what I want to say, so I'll just roll with it as is. The thought I had while listening to that discussion is that I consider there to be a difference between saying what is the right and wrong thing to do, and convicting another person of commiting the wrong thing to do. In the situation described, I don't think it was necessarily right to kill the weakest member. However, I don't think I could convict another person to murder for that act. I think that's a moment of extreme duress of which no member of the jury could have the faintest knowledge unless they'd been in one just like it themselves. In that regard, was any member of the jury truly one of the defendant's peers? To me the scenario and consequential trial are much more complicated than the initial discussion point.
Another thought I had was that in all the discussions, the audience was essentially considered to be an observer rather than an active participant. No consideration was given in the train scenario with the fat man over the bridge that the person making the decision jump in front of the train themselves. But going back to the train scenario, I think the manner in which the questions were framed make it a little difficult. For the changing tracks part of the question, why is it framed as murdering the one at all? Essentially the person is faced with the choice of one dies or five die. Given the circumstances, it seems to me that turning toward the one is more a matter of minimizing an accident than it is killing one to save five. Whether or not that is just semantics, I can't really say.
Going on to the Bentham reading on utility, I thought the argument presented was also a little simplistic. It kind of needs to be, but at the same time, to categorize things into either pain or pleasure, along with a scale of how much they provide doesn't seem like an easy thing to do, along with who determines these things if making community level actions. The way the paper is written, it seems there is no value in pain, and always value in pleasure. Similarly, evil is framed as in the manner that it produces pain so it is to be avoided, but no consideration is given to the pleasure one might enjoy in certain kinds of evil.
Also, is utilitarianism then an argument against minority rights within a democracy? Hypothetically if five can gain at the expense of three, is that the just thing to do?
Sorry this post isn't very well organized, but I still had a busy week last week even after I was done with finals, and didn't want to delay any further in getting this initial post up.
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If you don't like the examples given in the lecture, let's take one much more salient and appropriate. We could consider the killing of Bin Laden, murder. I suppose you could make the argument that it was saving many more lives by killing him. The interesting thing here is that he essentially had his trial in the media and in the meeting rooms of the CIA/White House. This will come up in a later lecture as to whether that constitutes justice. But I believe murder in this case is likely moral, as unpalatable as that statement seems to be.
ReplyDeleteSimilar to principles in justice, we have to put a burden of proof on those who would do the murdering. We should try to define the situations in which murder is justified. I will begin: clear evidence that others will be killed or injured and/or property destroyed. It is of course in ALL situations incumbent on the state to determine to produce such evidence in accordance with legal statutes and precedents. Let's not forget, and this is kind of embarrassing that this is the only example I can conjure, William Wallace was an enemy of the state or terrorist and probably technically received a trial in accordance with the laws of the time. I don't think any of us looking back on that would call it just or moral or in any way, right. It's hard to say that Wallace should have instead of attacking English forces, had sit-downs and protests in London.
Bing!
But that's a different scenario entirely, when you think about it. The situation with bin Laden is essentially a debate in regards to capital punishment rather than the murder of an innocent.
ReplyDeleteFirst, for each subject I propose we adhere to debate the idea not the form in which it was or will be presented (Elanor Roosevelt would appreciate that much). Second, debating facts as presented is permissible.
ReplyDeleteFirst, I want to defend Utilitarianism, having recently finished my second reading of JS Mill's version. The supposition that Util. is simply a practice of most-happy outcome is wrong, and JS Mill defends as much in his book, "...the notion ordinarily formed of its meaning (Utilit.) is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception".
Furthermore, the greatest-happiness principle per Utilitarianism does adhere to "rules and precepts of human conduct" and the utilitarian standard is not to consider only the "agent's own happiness, but all concerned", which may have been best exemplified by the man known as Jesus of Nazareth (no reference to religion).
Okay, onto the morality of murder. I will take a Nihilistic stance. We are highly evolved animals. Intra-species killings are not atypical in many animal kingdoms. Murder is a homo-sapiens construct. Homo-sapiens have highly evolved brains. We tend to make future plans and project into the future. Largely we object to murder based on self-centered altruism. We ourselves don't want to be murdered (so we can accomplish our future plans), so we will be nice enough to not murder others (I doubt this was always the case for our Homo ancestors. So are there circumstances when murder is permissible? Sure, as Brent mentions we did murder or assassinate Osama BL. Our President signs off on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq fully aware his pen stroke will mean the death of soldiers. We accept this as a society knowing our soldiers and "their" soldiers will die.
For me, it comes down to this. If we could inhibit the part of the brain that perhaps empathizes we might be more "ok" with murder. Because in circumstances such as OBL, it is our lack of empathy for him that helps rationalize the action.
I can't find the reference now, but there was an article in Wired or something that had exactly to do with what Jarrod just said.
ReplyDeleteOk I remembered:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/05/the-rewards-of-revenge/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+(Wired%3A+Index+3+(Top+Stories+2))
"he scientists played this game in front of the experimental subjects, allowing people to form strong opinions of the two “prisoners.” In many instances, people grew to strongly dislike those who defected, viewing them as untrustworthy cheaters. Then, while the subjects were stuck inside an fMRI machine, the scientists applied painful electrical shocks to the hands of the prisoners. Here’s where the results get interesting: Although every subject showed an increase of activity in pain-related areas when the prisoners were shocked — they couldn’t help but empathize with the hurt of others — this activity was slightly reduced when defectors were punished. In other words, their bad social behavior had diminished our sympathy, making us less interested in their pain."
Is empathy the same as, or at least derived from, self-centered altruism?
ReplyDeleteThat's a good question. To address it I will flip your sentence to make a logical argument...
ReplyDeleteIf self-centered altruism is absent, then empathy is absent.
This implies that conjuring up empathy for another individual requires projecting their circumstance onto yourself and determining, "that's bad". Thus "self-centered" is required for empathy. For me the "altruism" aspect of the phrase is the action that follows the introspection. Specifically, once you've determined that another individual's circumstance would be similarly bad for you, you decide not to act on certain impulses.
In the case of murder, I think they are related, but not causative. Self-centered altruism keeps our society peaceful (we don't murder neighbor without reason because we don't want to be murdered without reason). When murder might be justified, per OBL or self-defense, it is our loss of empathy for the antagonist that allows us to rationalize his/her murder.
Thoughts?
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/beckerposner/
ReplyDeleteJust as a random connection, Richard Posner, in his weekly blog noted that utilitarianism could be a justification for an increased global population. It made me wonder whether utilitarianism is an absolute or proportional concept. But that is probably a different post in and of itself.